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Abstract: This study investigated the interplay of politicians’ perceptions re-
garding the political influence of leading newspapers and the mass media’s
general impact on democracy. The scope of the study was restricted to demo-
cratic-corporatist media systems. We used comparative data of political elites
(N = 392; countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland)
and assessed direct and indirect effects of their perceptions about national
broadsheets’ political influence on the mass media’s perceived general impact
on democracy. As expected, we found a positive direct effect regarding percep-
tions of the media’s role in democracy that corresponds with theories stressing
the ‘guard-dog role’ of the quality press for political elites. However, we also
found a negative indirect effect of perceived newspaper influence through per-
ceptions of the media’s agenda-setting and career-controlling power. We argue
that this effect can be explained by feelings of disempowerment among politi-
cians. Arguably, perceived disempowerment causes criticism from political ac-
tors towards the media inasmuch as they feel constrained in the full exercise
of their democratic functions.
Keywords: perceptions, quality newspapers, politicians, democracy, media in-
fluence, media power
1 Introduction
The media system performs important functions for the political system (Aal-
berg and Curran, 2011; Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, and White,
2009; Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990). Consequently, Karl W. Deutsch (1963) had
already recognized the huge political significance of communication over 50
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years ago and termed it “the nerves of government”. But beyond that, mass
communication about political matters is also of crucial importance for the kind
of relationship citizens are expected to develop with their elected representa-
tives and the political system in general (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Gun-
ther and Mughan, 2000). Put differently, the extent to which modern democra-
cies fulfil specific criteria associated with their ‘health’ or ‘quality’, such as the
high quality of political discourse taking place in the public sphere leading to
high levels of representation, legitimacy, and political involvement, depends to
a large degree on the news media (Habermas, 1989).
Yet while much research exists on the presumably negative consequences
of political coverage spoiled by media logic on the level of political involvement
and political attitudes in the populace (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Maurer
2003), knowledge about how political decision makers assess the media’s im-
pact on democracy is very limited. However, those personal evaluations might
determine not only how legislators behave in the media arena but also how
they might think about issues like media regulation. There is some evidence
that European politicians’ relationship to the media as well as the coverage
addressed at them have both deteriorated (Brants, de Vreese, Möller, and van
Praag, 2010; Kepplinger, 2009a, 2009b). As McNair (2014) puts it: “Media organ-
izations pursue and harry political actors; (…) politicians attack journalists
for their perceived hostility and lack of respect for the democratic process”
(p. 297). But whether politicians’ media-related perceptions, which may be
strongly influenced by ephemeral events and experiences made in the day-
to-day business of dealing with the media, have the power to influence their
evaluation of the media’s general democratic input is an open question.
Hence, this paper approaches the relationship between the media and con-
temporary democracies from the perspective of political decision makers, and
asks how they perceive the mass media’s impact on the functioning of democra-
cy and whether perceptions concerning media power influence their assess-
ments. We concentrate on legislators (i.e., MPs and government officials), on
whom political power has been democratically delegated for a defined period
of time. Depending on political support from the electorate and from within
political institutions, politicians must care about the news media’s impact on
the public agenda, political opinions and decisions. Therefore, we study politi-
cians’ evaluations of the media’s democratic input in connection with their
perception regarding the media’s political influence. Research conducted in
Western European countries has recently pointed to the fact that MPs are con-
vinced that the mass media have an enormous influence on the political agenda
and on the career prospects of leading figures (Lengauer, Donges, and Plasser,
2014; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2011). According to this literature, the amount
Bereitgestellt von | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Universitätsbibliothek (LMU)
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 06.12.18 16:16
DE GRUYTER MOUTON A blessing or a double-edged sword? 3
of power ascribed to the media is remarkably high, but given that advanced
democracies are also advanced with respect to the mediatization of politics
(Strömbäck, 2008), it is hardly surprising.
However, the consequences that flow from these media power perceptions
for political actors’ attitudes towards the media’s impact on democratic govern-
ment are largely unexplored. Thus, we examined whether they influence their
assessment of the media’s impact on the functioning of democracy. Put differ-
ently, do politicians think that media power is problematic or not in terms of
the ability of the media to fulfil their democratic functions properly? We will
probe this question using data from legislators from six European countries
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland) sharing a demo-
cratic-corporatist media system and a consensus and party-oriented political
system. Due to their strong position in the media system, opinion-leading news-
papers are placed in a central position. They have traditionally been pillars of
party democracy and, at the same time, influential political actors in their own
right. Consequently, possible ambiguities in terms of politicians’ perceptions
towards the media should become visible, especially with respect to these influ-
ential media outlets.
2 The ambivalence of the political role of the
quality press’ for politicians
Some of the most important functions the media perform for democracy imply
their autonomy vis-à-vis political (and other) interests and a high degree of
professionalism in the treatment of news. If these conditions are met, the media
have a high degree of discretionary power over the political topics that are
most apparent in the public sphere and, thus, the media may exert political
influence on the policy agenda and possibly on other political decisions. In this
respect, Neidhardt (1994) pointed out that the prestigious media, in particular,
such as broadsheets with a national reach, fulfil a necessary orientation func-
tion for citizens who want to engage in or understand political debates. Other
research suggests that their orientation function even applies to political elites
(Davis, 2007). Moreover, according to Leurdijk, Slot and Nieuwenhuis, of all
the political news media, quality newspapers publish most of the political news
(as cited in Powers and Benson, 2014). In addition, they enjoy high levels of
trust from their audience (Kiousis, 2001).
Newspapers in general play a significant role in politics, especially in coun-
tries with a so-called democratic-corporatist media system (Hallin and Mancini,
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2004). This media-system type is characterized today by its high level of news-
paper circulation and a legacy of press-party parallelism (Hallin and Mancini,
2004; Humphreys, 1996; Mancini, 2012). In fact, by 2008, Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland showed the highest daily newspa-
per reach among all European countries, with between 70 and 81 % of the
population reading a newspaper every day (World Association of Newspapers,
2008). Traditionally, parties relied on the newspapers virtually allied to them
to secure and strengthen their support base in the population, and newspapers
also served as a forum for negotiation among contending interests. Even though
close parallelism is a thing of the past, newspapers still have political tenden-
cies, which is a part of their profile and reputation. Especially broadsheets with
a national circulation, the so-called quality press, enjoy a position as opinion-
leading media in all six countries studied herein. They are read by decision
makers from all sectors of society, and politicians believe that they influence
the formation of political opinions among voters, and act as agenda-setters for
the political system and for other media outlets (Davis, 2007, 2009; Fuchs and
Pfetsch, 1996). Moreover, results from a study from the nineties by Fuchs and
Pfetsch (1996) suggest that newspapers (and weeklies, which play an important
role in the German context) provide political actors with more instructive infor-
mation for the decision-making process than television does.
Hence, from the viewpoint of political actors, quality newspapers are an
extremely useful point of reference for determining or adjusting their own posi-
tions, since they can signal to them the range of what the attentive public
‘would accept as legitimate decisions in a given case’ (Habermas, 2006, p. 418).
Following democratic theorist Jürgen Habermas (2006), what distinguishes the
contribution of the quality press to democratic health from that of the electronic
media is the kind of political information they offer. According to Habermas,
the mode in which politics is mediated by the electronic media contributes to
a ‘diffuse alienation of citizens from politics’ (Habermas, 2006, p. 422). Con-
versely, the independent quality press, he says, employs a mode of mediation
that is conducive to a more democratic and participative political process.
Even putting normative considerations aside, from the perspective of politi-
cians, the political functions of quality newspapers are important constraints
for the achievement of their own objectives. Quality newspapers’ political sig-
nificance can yet have different meanings and implications for politicians.
These will first be systematized before their media-related perceptions are as-
sessed empirically. First, we examine potentially beneficial functions of the
press for party democracy from the politicians’ perspective. Second, we will
mention aspects of the press’ power that may disturb politicians and, thus,
dampen their enthusiasm regarding the media’s impact on democracy.
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3 The usefulness of the quality press for
political actors
The quality press is the type of medium that most closely follows the political
agenda of the government, of the opposition, and is interested in political par-
ties’ internal processes in terms of opinion formation. This loyalty for, and
pronounced interest in, party politics stems from the times when newspapers
were – apart from being information channels – more so than they are today
also the media for political expression and mobilization (see Hallin and Man-
cini, 2004 and Mancini, 2012 for an overview). However, the orientation towards
(a) political substance rather than superficial drama or personalization and (b)
the agenda of (parliamentary) parties is still a particular feature of the quality
press. In addition, in all countries studied herein, at least two leading newspa-
pers with different political leanings exist. This is, for one, conducive to politi-
cal pluralism in the public sphere and, secondly, it ensures that both the center-
left and center-right parties have their preferred outlets when they try to bring
specific issues or viewpoints into the political debate or need public forums to
explain political proposals.
Furthermore, American researchers have made the argument that leading
media outlets, such as the Washington Post and the New York Times, tend to
align their own agendas to the issues and interpretation favored by the political
elite. Especially in the case of foreign affairs, the leading papers tend to be
co-opted by government officials, all too often neglecting their watchdog role
(Bennett, Lawrence, and Stevenson, 2007). Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston
(2006) suggest that political journalists – of whom the great majority work for
newspapers – determine how much power politicians hold when they make a
decision regarding who is able to contribute to a policy story. In the same vein,
Donohue, Tichenor and Olien (1995) compare the role of leading media outlets
in the US context with that of guard dogs of the established power structure of
the political system. As guard dogs, they stabilize the system and tend to pro-
tect its modes of decision making and its political authorities.
The tendencies of the quality press to reflect the same range of opinions
that the political elites defend is not unknown to European democracies either.
Thus, as Eilders states for the German context, ‘the party structure is still re-
flected in today’s press system, especially in opinion-leading national quality
newspapers’ (2002, p. 29).
Finally, there is another reason to expect that politicians do perceive of a
special relationship between the quality press and democracy. The majority of
political journalists in the capitals work for newspapers, and the most re-
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nowned work for the quality press. They stand in a symbiotic relationship with
MPs and government officials: the journalists’ stock-in-trade is in having access
to good sources and being ‘chummy’ with influential policymakers. In ex-
change, they can offer politicians more space for political background than any
other mass medium can. This gives politicians a good chance of being able to
control the news agenda and of introducing their desired spin.
4 Leading newspapers’ own political influence
as constraint for political actors
However, media outlets – and this applies in particular to leading newspa-
pers – are more than mere conduits for the power of politicians. Rather, they
must be seen as political actors in their own right too (Couldry and Curran,
2003; Eilders, 2002; Pfetsch and Adam, 2008). Due to the differentiation of the
media and political systems in advanced post-industrial democracies, media
outlets have become fully autonomous from political actors (Hallin and Man-
cini, 2004). In recent decades, the pendulum has even swung in the opposite
direction; that is, the logic that media outlets process political events has forced
political actors to more or less adopt the media’s criteria of newsworthiness in
order to secure their access to the mass-mediated public sphere (Strömbäck,
2008). This is known as the mediatization hypothesis, and it suggests that the
media have intruded into the political system (Strömbäck and Esser, 2009),
thereby forcing political actors to adapt their agendas increasingly to meet with
the criteria of newsworthiness that the media dictates (de Beus, 2011; Ström-
bäck, 2008).
How strong the media’s political influence has become is hard to assess,
though. It becomes manifest first of all in the tendencies of politicians to adapt
their own behavior to political issues or frames emphasized by opinion-leading
media outlets. Hence, as Lengauer, Donges and Plasser (2014), as well as Mau-
rer (2011), have pointed out, media influence or ‘power’ emerges from perceptu-
al ascriptions of influence by the political elite. Therefore, researchers have
begun to study political actors’ individual perceptions of the media’s political
agenda-setting and career-controlling influence in some Western European de-
mocracies. Results point to the fact that politicians assume that the media
strongly influence both the political agendas and the career prospects of politi-
cians. This finding is consistent, regardless of whether MPs were surveyed us-
ing closed-ended items (Strömbäck, 2011; Van Aelst et al., 2008; Van Aelst and
Walgrave, 2011; Walgrave, 2008) or whether in-depth interviews were conduct-
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ed with them (Davis, 2007, 2009). Moreover, the findings point to an apparent
dissatisfaction among MPs with how the media covers politics. For instance,
the large majority of a non-representative sample of MPs surveyed in a Dutch
study held the view that journalistic coverage of political matters ‘leads to lack
of trust in politics’ (Brants et al., 2010, p. 35).
Furthermore, empirical findings suggest the possibility that perceptions of
a powerful or ‘intrusive’ media spur the dissatisfaction of politicians in the
media and “lead” to perceptions that journalists are overstepping their compe-
tencies. Hence, in a recent study, Maurer and Pfetsch (2014) detected that the
more politicians perceive journalists as acting politically, the more elements of
media logic they see in political coverage. Moreover, many other studies agree
that parliamentarians in several European democracies are convinced that the
mass media have gained an unduly strong influence over the political process
(Dohle, Blank, and Vowe, 2012; Kepplinger, 2009b; Walgrave, 2008). For exam-
ple, Walgrave (2008) found that the perceptions of the strong agenda-setting
power of the news media are spurred on by perceptions that the media is overly
powerful. In line with this, other results suggest a positive association between
MPs’ dissatisfaction with the media’s coverage of politics and their perception
that the media is more powerful than it should be (Dohle et al., 2012; Van Aelst
et al., 2008).
Evidence from Sweden suggests that political actors feel pushed into adapt-
ing to the media reality of politics (Strömbäck, 2011), and German studies have
consistently found that political elites assume that mass-mediated cues impact
opinions in the citizenry (Dohle et al., 2012; Fuchs and Pfetsch, 1996). Hence,
chances are high that political elites feel pushed into adapting their original
political programs to a mainstream agenda, which is heavily influenced by
actors in the media system. Based on his own results in line with this assump-
tion, Davis (2007, p. 188) uses the term ‘media-oriented policy-making’ to de-
scribe British MPs’ adaptation to a policy agenda that is pre-defined by the
media system.
Hence, in sum, the available findings on politicians’ perceptions of the rela-
tionship between media and policymakers point in the opposite direction to
the conventional wisdom. They indicate that politicians are concerned and
overwhelmed by empowered and professionalized journalism, which challen-
ges their prerogatives as elected decision makers in two respects: First, politi-
cians increasingly stand helplessly by in the face of the ability of the leading
media to proactively set the public agenda and thereby force them to react with
statements and policies. This is equivalent to adapting the policy agenda to
meet with the media agenda, and not vice versa. Second, since the media prefer
to construct political news stories around personalities, the career prospects of
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politicians have become increasingly vulnerable to their media image and to
their personal relations with the media elites. Both forms of (perceived) media
power, available research suggests, are recognized by political elites from Euro-
pean party democracies. However, the question is whether these perceptions
have a negative bearing on how politicians view the democratic impact of the
media, and thereby lead them to change their perceptions regarding the demo-
cratic role and impact of opinion-leading media such as the quality press.
5 Summary and hypotheses
We trace the relationship between the perceptions of the media’s political influ-
ence and the perceptions about the media’s impact on democratic functioning
using a large sample of politicians from democracies with a ‘democratic-corpo-
ratist’ media system and the same type of political system, that is, party or
consensus democracy. To reiterate, the aim of this study was to explore whether
and how politicians’ perceptions of the political impact of leading newspapers
influence their perceptions of the media’s impact on European (party) democra-
cies’ functioning. We not only consider the direct connection between the inde-
pendent variable – the perceived political influence of quality newspapers –
and the dependent variable – perceptions of the mass media’s impact on de-
mocracy performance – but also take into account that a possible direct effect
might be mediated by perceptions of the agenda-setting and career-controlling
power of the media.
Based on the foregoing arguments, we must consider that political elites
cultivate ambivalent orientations towards quality newspapers. Thus, it seems
realistic to expect that political elites perceive quality newspapers as a blessing
for democracy and, at the same time, as competing ‘agenda-setters’ and illegiti-
mate ‘kingmakers’ (Semetko, Blumler, Gurevitch, and Weaver, 1991; Weaver,
Graber, McCombs, and Eyall, 1981). Therefore, as the first hypothesis, we expect
that political elites’ perceptions that the quality press has a strong political
impact lead to positive evaluations of the media’s contribution to the quality
of democracy (H 1a). As additional hypothesis, we predict a negative indirect
effect of politicians’ perceptions of quality newspapers’ political influence on
their perceptions of the news media’s impact on democracy (H 1b).
How does the indirect effect work? we believe that it is straightforward to
assume a positive effect of the perception that quality newspapers have a strong
political influence on the perception that the media in general exercise a strong
influence over the policy agenda (H 2) and the careers of politicians (H 3).
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Figure 1: Theoretical model. Black arrows stand for influence. +/− = positive/negative
influence.
Furthermore, it flows from the foregoing review of studies investigating politi-
cians’ media power perceptions that a strong agenda-setting power and career-
controlling influence of the media has problematic consequences for political
elites: They might feel partly disempowered by intrusive media. Consequently,
it can be assumed that a politician’s perception that the media strongly impact
the policy agenda (H 4), on the one hand, and political careers (H 5), on the
other, has a negative influence on his or her attitude towards the media’s demo-
cratic role.
To sum up, according to the first hypothesis (H 1a), political elites embrace
the political significance of quality newspapers as the ‘guard dogs’ of the politi-
cal system; hence, the predicted positive direct effect on their perceptions of
the media system’s democratic input. In addition, we expect a negative indirect
effect of their perceptions about the political significance of quality papers on
the same evaluation through perceptions of a strong media influence on the
political agenda and on the rise and fall of politicians (H 1b). The expected
relationships are summarized in Figure 1.
6 Method
To test the hypotheses and the assumed chain of causality, we estimated a path
model (df = 0). Data were collected in a survey of political representatives –
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either MPs or government officials – from the above-mentioned six European
democracies: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.
Politicians were interviewed as part of a collaborative research project on politi-
cal communication culture in Western European countries. Due to the similarity
of the political contexts, we treated the political elites as one functional group,
and thus had a sufficient number of cases to build and test a model of the
effects of their individual media power perceptions on their evaluation of the
media’s democratic input.
Of the total number of participants (N = 392), the overwhelming majority
were members of one of the national parliaments (N = 358), and a small group
came from the national governments (N = 34). As noted earlier, the rationale
behind the country selection was similarity with respect to the media and politi-
cal system characteristics and, thus, it provided a homogenous context in terms
of political communication. We took advantage of this similarity of contexts to
enlarge our sample of political elites. Testing the hypotheses with a path model
would not have been possible with only one country because there were not
enough cases. It is important to note that it was not our primary goal to com-
pare perceptions across the six countries. Rather, we wanted to test the hypoth-
eses with an accurate sample.
7 Sample
A positional approach was used for the sampling (Hoffmann-Lange, 1987),
which rested on the premise that political influence is bound to formal posi-
tions. The influential positions in the governmental system were defined by
national experts of all of the countries during project meetings. As a result
of the discussions, all of the ministers, secretaries of state, leadership of the
parliamentary groups, chairpersons and deputies of the parliamentary standing
commissions, presidents and deputies of the houses were included. However,
in Switzerland and Denmark, no government elites could be reached. National
particularities as regards the organizational structure of the legislative and ex-
ecutive bodies were considered when the sampling frames were constructed.
Sampling was done by the national experts, who decided about replacements
when a selected politician declined to participate, or could not be reached.1
1 To increase participation, respondents could choose between a telephone interview, a per-
sonal interview, an online questionnaire or a questionnaire to be completed by hand. Most
interviews were conducted over the phone and in the online mode.
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Response rates among MPs varied between 21 and 64 % depending on the
country, but were satisfactory altogether given that political elites are extremely
difficult to reach and that the length of the entire interview was between 30 and
45 minutes (due to the international project context).2 If a politician definitively
declined an interview, he or she was replaced by another person holding a
similar position, if possible. In the German case, it was necessary, though, to
replace faction leaders and speakers of standing committees with MPs without
such functions.3 The distribution of respondents across countries (Government/
MPs) shows that most come from Finland (N = 5/N = 95), followed by Sweden
(N = 12/N = 81), Germany (N = 9/N = 58), Switzerland (N (MPs) = 64), Austria
(N = 8/N = 30) and Denmark (N (MPs) = 35), with 62.2 % of the respondents
male and 37.8 % female. Respondents mostly fall into the 50 to 59 age group,
followed by the group of 40- to 49-year-olds. With very few exceptions, the age
of the respondents ranged between 30 and 69 years. Fieldwork started in April
and May 2008 and lasted until at least June 2008, depending on the country.4
Respondents were asked to respond to a multi-page questionnaire designed by
a team of country experts as part of the international research project. It includ-
ed a broad range of items measuring different perceptions relating to political
communication and socio-demographics. The measures used in this analysis
were taken from that survey.
2 Response rates in percent for the respective countries (Government officials/MPs): Austria:
24.4 %/23.5 %; Denmark: −/58.6 %; Finland: 38.0 %/57.0 %; Germany: 26.7 %/21.1 %; Switzer-
land: −/34.4 %; Sweden: 22.4 %/64.4 %.
The response rate for Germany was not much lower than those rates obtained in comparable
MP surveys. For example, Dohle and Bernhard (2014) attained 31.3 % and Kepplinger (2009b)
31 %.
3 Non-response was not correlated with any specific characteristic of the sample. The only
exception was that in the Swedish sample parliamentarians of the Social Democratic Party
and in Germany members of the Conservative Party are slightly underrepresented. In the Swiss
sample, German-speaking parliamentarians were slightly overrepresented compared to the
French-speaking ones.
4 In Finland, fieldwork went on until September 2008, and in Denmark, until January 2009.
In Germany and Sweden, a second fieldwork phase after the initial phase in spring/summer
2008 was necessary to enable us to conduct all of the interviews. The second fieldwork took
place in Sweden from October to November 2008 and in Germany between November 2008
and March 2009.
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8 Measures
All respondents answered the same questionnaire. Equivalence of wording was
ensured through a harmonisation process of translations within the network of
experts and was verified by reverse translation. The constructs were measured
by one closed-ended item each with five-point Liker-type scales for expressing
agreement or disagreement. Attitudes towards the media’s influence on how well
the democracy functions (M = 3.10, SD = .90), the dependent variable in our
model, were measured by asking politicians, ‘In your opinion, does media cov-
erage have a positive or a negative impact on how well democracy functions
in your country?’, with answer categories ranging from very negative (coded as
‘1’) to very positive (coded as ‘5’).
Presumed media influence was measured by a number of items: The core
independent variable is the perceived significance of quality newspapers. The
item reads: ‘Media can have a different impact on politics. In your opinion,
how strong is the impact of the quality press?’ (M = 3.87, SD = .86). Answer
categories ranged from not strong at all (coded as ‘1’) to very strong (coded as
‘5’). Perceived media influence on the political agenda (M = 3.30, SD = .99) was
measured by the following statement, ‘It is the media and not the politicians
who decide which issues are important in politics and determine the political
agenda’, with answer categories ranging from strongly disagree (coded as ‘1’)
to strongly agree (coded as ‘5’). Perceived media influence on the career path of
political leaders (M = 3.63, SD = 1.07) was measured by the statement ‘Media
make and break politicians’. Again, answer categories ranged from strongly
disagree (coded as ‘1’) to strongly agree (coded as ‘5’). The following items were
included as controls: the perceived significance of tabloids and TV as well as
the gender and political experience of the respondents (political experience in
years: M = 15.07, SD = 10.16). For the perceived significance of tabloids (M =
3.35, SD = 1.02) and TV (public service TV: M = 4.20, SD = .79; commercial TV:
M = 3.01, SD = 1.07), the same item wording and scale as for the quality press
were used. Including other media perceptions than the perceptions of quality
newspapers as control variables certainly reduced the size of the effects, but it
was worthwhile for the sake of a realistic assessment of the influences.
9 Results
We used the structural-equation modelling software Amos to test the hypoth-
eses. In the first step, the path model outlined in Figure 1 was specified. We
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specified the causal directions as discussed in the theory section. As there is
insufficient evidence to specify a causal direction between the perceived media
influence on the issues’ agenda and on the careers of politicians, we simply
specified a correlational relationship.
In addition to the variables specified in Figure 1, the full model contained
the following control variables: the perceived significance of tabloid newspa-
pers, public service and commercial television, the political experience of politi-
cians and their gender.5 We very briefly report on the significant correlations
between the control variables ‘gender’ and ‘political experience’ with some of
the endogenous variables before we turn to the effect of the perceived impact
of quality newspapers on the dependent variable. Path coefficients show that
the women perceived the political influence of the quality press as somewhat
higher than the men did (γ = 0.19, p < 0.05), and they also perceived that there
was more media influence on the political agenda (γ = 0.22, p < 0.05).
We turn first to the predicted effect described by H 1a. It predicted a posi-
tive effect of the politicians’ perceived strength of the political influence of the
quality press on perceptions concerning the news media’s impact on the health
of democracy. This hypothesis was supported by a positive (standardized) path
coefficient (.12, p < 0.05), as shown in Figure 2.
The corresponding standardized path coefficients for H 2, H 3, H 4 and H 5
are shown in Figure 2. We note that the effect of the presumed impact of the
quality press on the media’s presumed agenda-setting power is positive (γ =
.04, n.s.) but insignificant, whereas the same perception had a significant effect
on the media’s presumed impact on political careers (γ = .18, p < 0.001). As
regards the influences of the perceptions that the media determines the politi-
cal agenda (γ = .20, p < 0.001) and makes (or breaks) the careers of politicians
(γ = −.08, n.s.) on perceptions concerning the news media’s role in democracy,
they are both negative, as predicted. Only the coefficient associated with the
influence of the perceived agenda-setting power is significant.
Now we turn to the supplementary hypothesis of H 1a; that is, H 1b. It
predicted a negative indirect effect of the perceived strength of quality newspa-
pers’ political influence on perceptions concerning the news media’s impact on
the health of democracy running through respondents’ perceptions of the
strength of the news media’s power to influence the political agenda and the
career paths of politicians. Indeed, a small negative (standardized) indirect ef-
fect, which, however, reached statistical significance, was found (Coeff = −.02,
p < 0.04; using bootstrapping). Thus, the perceived influence of the quality
5 The full path model can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Figure 2: Direct and indirect effects for the quality press’ perceived political impact (stan-
dardized path coefficients). Black arrows stand for influence; grey dashed arrows stand for
insignificant paths.
Note: The size of the indirect effect of QUALITY through AGENDA and CAREERS on DEMOCRA-
CY is Coeff. −.02.
press not only had a positive direct effect on the political elites’ assessment of
the media’s impact on democracy, but also a negative indirect effect through
the perceived media influence on the political-issue agenda and on the careers
of politicians. Actually, a similar indirect effect was also found for the perceived
political significance of tabloids (−.04, p < 0.001; using bootstrapping6) but
there was no significant direct effect for that type of newspaper.
Taken together, the direct positive effect of the perceived political impact
of opinion-leading newspapers on politicians’ evaluations of the media’s im-
pact on democracy indicates that political decision makers seem to associate
this particular type of media outlet with the democratic functions of the media
6 Although the direct effect of the perceived media influence on politicians’ careers on percep-
tions of the media’s impact on democracy did not achieve significance, the specific indirect
effect (see Holbert and Stephenson, 2003) of the perceived political significance of the quality
press on it through perceived news media influence on political careers did (z = −.4.73, p <
.05).
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system. That said, we also note a negative indirect effect, which is, however,
substantially smaller than the positive direct effect. Hence, from the perspective
of politicians, the impact of quality newspapers on the functioning of democra-
cy is indeed of an ambiguous nature.
10 Discussion
At the center of this study stood the consequences of politicians’ perceptions
regarding the political impact of the news media and, in particular, quality
newspapers in terms of their evaluations as to whether the media in general
are beneficial or harmful to democracy. Especially in political communication
systems made up of a democratic-corporatist media system like we analyzed
here, the quality press has always played a crucial role in linking the political
elite and society. However, European democracies have experienced declining
trust in political institutions as well as increasing media power, and it seems
that the relationship between politicians and journalists has become tenser
against this background. Against this background, political actors need to mas-
ter the interaction with influential media outlets if they wish to win and hold
power. Thus, it finally seemed questionable as to whether the political elites
would see the influential newspapers exclusively as ‘guard dogs’ of established
political processes, or rather as challengers to their own leading role in the
political system.
The analysis actually revealed a positive and a negative effect of newspa-
pers’ perceived political influence on the evaluation of the media’s democratic
input. The positive effect is in line with the guard-dog theory as regards the
political role of the quality press. Thus, politicians indeed seem to see the qual-
ity press as a blessing for the political system, and they seem to appreciate its
function in the political process. However, the analysis of the interplay between
their media-related perceptions also revealed a negative indirect effect regard-
ing the newspapers’ perceived significance. The size of the effect was indeed
small, but this could be expected given that it is an indirect effect. This indirect
effect of the presumed influence of the quality press on the democratic evalu-
ation of the media’s overall performance was mediated by politicians’ percep-
tions of the mass media’s agenda-setting and career-controlling power. How
can this finding, which goes against the conventional wisdom, be interpreted?
One possible explanation is that the strength of the quality press as an
opinion leader and an autonomous force that can mold public opinion fosters
not only trust in the media system among the political elites but also feelings
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of ‘disempowerment’ vis-à-vis the news media. Politicians obviously amalga-
mate their perceptions of an influential press, and their perceptions of the me-
dia’s general agenda-setting and career-controlling power. For obvious reasons,
politicians may not like the idea that the press’ influence also expands to deci-
sions taken inside political institutions, because it has no democratic legitimacy
for that. Practically, a strong media influence might constrain their choices and
make political compromise harder to achieve. For example, due to the per-
ceived media influence on the public agenda, political actors may refrain from
addressing issues they see as important but which they think fall outside the
media’s area of interest. However, this may disrupt links between them and
specific societal groups. Hence, the negative indirect effect makes sense, given
that we surveyed legislators who certainly need media with a broad reach to
communicate with society, but who are primarily accountable to societal inter-
ests and the groups of voters that they represent. Therefore, the perceived need
for media-centered policymaking may be very costly for parties and politicians
in terms of losing ground in some of their core constituencies.
In a way, the finding of a negative influence of politicians’ perceptions of
media power on their evaluation of the media’s democratic performance an-
swers to the findings of a positive association between MPs’ perceptions of
politically powerful media and a critical view regarding the consequences of
its influence (Brants et al., 2010; Dohle and Bernhard, 2014). Hence, if we com-
bine our findings and these findings, we can cautiously conclude that from the
political actors’ point of view, the media’s influence on politics can result in a
growing trade-off between vote-seeking and policy-seeking for politicians. This
may lead to feelings of disempowerment and media cynicism.
In sum, the results presented here are testament to the politicians’ unease
with the growing media power, and they highlight disturbing implications re-
garding their general attitudes towards the media system.
Like all research projects, this one has a number of limitations. Although
many efforts were made to get all of the leading politicians in the six democra-
cies to participate, the full array of top-ranking politicians could not be includ-
ed. Participation by cabinet members was very rare and the participation of
parliamentarians in leadership roles was uneven across countries: It was higher
in the smaller countries, whereas in Germany, most respondents were MPs
without an outstanding function. Second, as it was a cross-sectional analysis,
we cannot prove causality with this design. It is also not fully satisfactory that
we had to use single-item measures and could not use scales to measure the
constructs. Finally, it has to be underscored that we only measured perceived,
not ‘real’ influence. That being said, perceived influence and especially its as-
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sessment as positive or negative with respect to democratic government could
trigger a wide range of behavioral reactions by politicians.
In other studies, the perceived media influence was found to trigger media
motivation and effort, and more parliamentary activities among MPs (Cohen,
Tsfati, and Shaefer, 2008). Hence, it does not seem far-fetched to wonder
whether negative attitudes towards the media and beliefs in strong media pow-
er could provoke media-adverse legislation, maybe not in mature democracies
but in new democracies or in systems that are in transition. Therefore, further
research on the presumed media influence and the consequences of those be-
liefs among political decision makers should include younger democracies,
such as post-communist countries and emerging democracies in Asia or Latin
America, where freedom of the press is still a more fragile achievement.
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